Emergence recently has becom e a popular term in some fields of science as well as in philosophy. Historically, it had already been widely used in the field of evolutionary theory and in what is now called philosophy of mind. In ordinary language to emerge simply means to becom e known or appar ent or to arise from certain conditions. However, as emergence is slowly turning into a technical term, its meaning should be made explict in order to be clear what one means. Particularly we wanted to take a look at the actual usage and the possible role of the notion of em ergence in science. We chose to restrict ourselves to the mostly shared fields of com petence the coauthors represent, i.e. electrophysiological single cell recording in cats and monkeys, mathematical modelling of pattern formation in connection with neural activity and developm ental neurobiology.
On the Meanings of Emergence
Emergence recently has becom e a popular term in some fields of science as well as in philosophy. Historically, it had already been widely used in the field of evolutionary theory and in what is now called philosophy of mind. In ordinary language to emerge simply means to becom e known or appar ent or to arise from certain conditions. However, as emergence is slowly turning into a technical term, its meaning should be made explict in order to be clear what one means. Particularly we wanted to take a look at the actual usage and the possible role of the notion of em ergence in science. We chose to restrict ourselves to the mostly shared fields of com petence the coauthors represent, i.e. electrophysiological single cell recording in cats and monkeys, mathematical modelling of pattern formation in connection with neural activity and developm ental neurobiology.
It is helpful to distinguish between two levels of inquiry. They can be characterized by two ques tions. On the epistem ological level we ask: What do we know about the world? For example: D o we know what activity a neuron in area V I has when a m onkey looks at a moving bar? Or: Can we infer (predict) neural activity in the cortex of a m onkey engaged in a memory task when we * This communication is a contribution to the workshop on "Natural Organisms, Artificial Organisms, and Their Brains" at the Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung (ZiF) In philosophy of science, emergence is used in the ontological domain, i.e. it refers to the objec tive properties of systems themselves and not to our knowledge of them. A property of a system is called weakly emergent, if it is not a property of a component but is determined by the properties, arrangement, and interactions of the components of the system. Strong emergence is weak em er gence plus the thesis that those system properties cannot fully be explanatorily reduced to the prop erties, arrangement, and interactions of the sys tem 's components.
There is a second distinction in the time domain. Weak and strong emergence as explained can be called synchronic as they refer to systems in which component and system properties exist in the same time span. If a property emerges in time we call this diachronic emergence. Notice, that the problem of explanation and reduction is primarily a problem of synchronic emergence whereas dia chronic emergence is more closly related to the ordinary language view of appearing.
In our discussions we concluded that from a sci entific view we cannot accept the notion of "strong em ergence" in the neural and behavioural or cog nitive domains since it would imply an a priori ir reducibility of macroscopic phenomena such as 0939-5075/98/0700-0770 $ 06.00 © 1998 Verlag der Zeitschrift für Naturforschung. Tübingen • www.znaturforsch.com. N the EEG. We decided to adopt a view in which the formation of patterns is the problem around which aspects of emergence can be accessed.
Pattern Formation in Models of Neural Activity
Neural networks are often conceived o f primar ily as sophisticated devices that transform input into output in manners that can be quite complex. From the early days of theoretical work in neural networks, however, the capacity of neural net works to generate patterns autonom ously has been studied in appropriate mathematical models (Wilson and Cowan, 1973; Amari, 1977) . In these models, connections within a network o f neurons are sufficiently strong so as to stabilize patterns of activation even in the absence of sensory input. Mathematically, such networks go through insta bilities as parameters such as the total amount of input are varied. These instabilities define the strongly cooperative limit case, in which these neural networks generate responses that are not entirely determined by input.
This property can be used to address the poten tial, or also real, ambiguity of visual sensory infor mation. For instance, the perception of coherent apparent motion arises in response to stimuli that are potentially highly ambiguous, because motion can be seen between many different parts of the visual array if those parts are presented in isola tion. This ambiguity can som etim es be realized in experience, when two or more perceptually dis tinct patterns arise from identical stimuli. The properties of such bistable percepts are com pati ble with those predicted from an account in terms of strongly cooperative neural networks (H ock et al., 1993; Giese, 1997). In this account, all poten tial elementary motions are activated in a neural representation, but those realized in experience inhibit those not realized in experience to a d e gree. Under appropriate circumstances, this pattern of interaction leads to bistability: either of the competing elementary m otions can be acti vated. If the stimulus is changed so as to favor one of the alternative organized patterns of m otion, the differences in activation between perceived and unperceived elementary motions decreases. This leads to the prediction that adaptation, con sidered a measure of the degree of activation of a particular motion detector, depends on the per ceived motion pattern: more stable motion pat terns are stronger adaptors. This turns out to be empiricially true (Hock et al., 1996) . On the other hand, adaptation occurs to stimulated but unper ceived elementary motions! Thus pattern level and elementary motion level are really one and the same.
Strong cooperativity thus leads to pattern for mation in visual perception. This form of pattern formation is flexible, because continuously many different patterns can be generated as simulation changes. Thus, although motion percepts have reg ularity such as those captured by the Gestalt rules, which result from the pattern of interaction in the neural network, the network remains responsive to stimulation and in this sense is capable of pro cessing information. This form of pattern forma tion might thus be considered emergent, because the pattern resulting is not uniquely determined by the current stimulus. Fluctuations, prior percep tual history, but also information from other layers of representation may contribute to the formation of an organized percept.
We also discussed a model for neural activities that demonstrates emergence of spatiotemporal patterns when the external noise level is increased. Each of its elem ents is subject to external noise. These elements (McCulloch-Pitts neurons) are isotropically arranged on a lattice and interact with a strength that depends exponentially on their pair wise Euclidian distance. This system displays large scale emergent spatio-temporal structures at very specific values of unspecific, external, stochastic parameters namely the amplitude of the stochastic fluctuations (spatiotemporal stochastic reso nance). Several global, geometric parameters of the emergent patterns (mean curvature of spirals) can be observed to be correlated with the this mi croscopic parameter. Similarily the response to ex ternal stimuli (e.g. moving bar) is observed to be correlated to microscopic parameters for instance in a resonant response to the stimulus velocity (Mayer-Kress, 1998: this issue, pp. 677-685).
Pattern Formation in Cognition and Neural Functioning
A large body of evidence from neuropsychology, electrophysiology and neuroimaging indicates that cortical function, including working memory, is mediated by distributed representations over many distinct subdivisions of the cortex containing cellular assemblies. Thus, neural coding is based on dynamic recruitment of neurons into dynamical functional groups. A certain object can then be thought of as being represented as a unique pattern of activated neural subnets and, thus, rep resenting the response of the system to the corre sponding stimulus in a distributed manner. Thereby so-called working memory and long-term memory seem to share the same neural substrate in the cerebral cortex. That substrate consists in a system of widespread, overlapping and intercon nected networks of cortical neurons. Such configu rations, which are hierarchically organized, can be regarded as patterns in the temporal as well as the spatial domain. Thus, pattern formation in com plex systems seem s to be appropriate as a concep tual frame for a theory of neuronal functioning. Within this framework, the formation of patterns is due to the internal dynamics of the entire system which is related to the architecture of the system (Fuster, 1998: this issue, pp. 670-676).
The Concept of Cell Assemblies
Cell assemblies constitute a unifying concept in theorizing on spatiotemporal patterns of neural activity. It has been suggested that groups of cells related to the same visual percept, memorandum (memory), or motor act may join with other neu rons involved in the same process. Hebb (1949) originally proposed the existence of cell assem blies of simultaneously active neurons that are formed on the basis of the specificity of anatomi cal connections. Recently, it was proposed that these assemblies are more than just coactivated groups of neurons, because they share a certain label. M oreover, physiological evidence suggest that assemblies can be formed dynamically. Two candidate labels for assembly formation are syn chrony of action potentials fired by different neu rons, and co-modulations of firing rates. According to the first candidate mechanism, neurons that participate in a single assembly fire their action potentials at approximately the same time. A c cording to the second mechanism, neurons that belong to a single assembly all exhibit an en hanced firing rate. In this way each individual neu ron may join different groups according to the task requirements. Although the usefulness of the con cept is evident, it is not yet supported by unequiv ocal evidence, and a hot topic for debate among neuroscientists. Nonetheless, ongoing research in the visual modality (R oelfsem a, 1998: this issue, pp. 6 9 1 -7 1 5 ) and in sensorimotor integration (Vaadia, 1998: this issue, pp. 657-669) provides supportive evidence for the involvement of syn chrony and rate modulations in the dynamic for mation of cell assemblies.
The configurations of cell assemblies appear to be highly dynamic. D ue to changes in the activa tion of the nervous system and also due to the plasticity of the system, as observed as the modifi cation of interneuronal interactions, each cell can rapidly associate with a functional group and dissassociate from it again. Such modulation of neu ronal interactions allow each neuron to becom e a member of several different groups and partici pate in different computational tasks. The above notion is supported by experimental findings which indicate that the level of correlated activity between neurons can be modified on a short time scale, within the range of a basic cognitive process such as stimulus perception or preparation of a specific m ovem ent (Vaadia, 1998).
Emergence of Large Scale Oscillations in the EEG
On a microscopic level we have evidence for functionally related cell assemblies that can show synchronous activity on a large range of scales: From single columns including of the order of thousands of neurons to assemblies that dynami cally recruit millions of neurons. The correspond ing time-scales span ranges from milliseconds to tens of milliseconds (e.g. 40 Hz oscillations). A l though it is evident that synchronous activity on a micro-level can generate a macroscopic electro magnetic signal (E E G /M E G ) it is still a largely open problem how an observed EEG pattern (and their range of frequencies and voltage levels) can be reduced to the activity of neuronal cell assem blies. There exists, however, some evidence for a correlation of activity on both a cellassembly level as well as as an EEG /M EG level with stimuli and behavior. We can also expect that with learning we will find an increase in the number of cells in volved in a certain assembly. In the context of this workshop the emergence of macroscopic electro magnetic brain signals can be considered to be of a relatively strong type. An interesting open prob lem is to establish closer connections between the spike patterns (attractors) recorded from cells and the complexity observed in the EEG /M EG as it varies as a function of the type of input. For exam ple response to input of multiple modality could involve the activation of multiple assemblies which then could be reflected in a large range of changes in frequencies (Fuster, 1998 : this issue, pp. 6 7 0 -676; Mayer-Kress, 1998: this issue, pp. 6 7 7 -6 8 5 ).
Setting the Stage
Basic structural features of neural networks are generated in the course of brain developm ent un der the instruction of the genes, These, in turn, are products of evolution. In its course, novel brain capabilities may have arisen, in part of the cases, as consequences of duplications and recombina tions of genes or its parts, especially of its regula tory sections; though immediate phenotype effects are expected to be small, such events may have initiated distinct new directions of evolution. G en erally, the fundamental role of developm ental ge netics for an understanding of brainfunctions should not be underestimated. Growing axons navigate using genetically determined qualitative and quantitative biochemical guidance cues to form appropriate connections. Internally gener ated activity-dependent processes lead to further specifications such as map sharpening, but initial and boundary conditions of such self-organisation are still under genetic control. This sets the stage for modifications by external inputs, including learning. The relative contribution of activity-dependent processes in the formation of the neural network is itself a result of evolutionary forces. Too much self-organization, despite its intellectual appeal, would reduce fitness because it would take too long to develop (Gierer and Müller, 1995; Gierer, 1998 : this issue, pp. 7 1 6 -7 2 2 ).
Concluding Remarks

Specific conclusions: the limitations o f the pattern view
In our discussions we have re-interpreted the problem of emergence into the problem of how pattern are formed at multiple levels, under the influence of the environment, flexibly and dynami cally. We have discussed a small set of examples which were intended to stand paradigmatically for a larger ensemble of phenomena. D oes this pattern view exhaust the domain of natural and artificial systems? This must remain an open ques tion. Higher cognitive functions including, in par ticular language, are not reached by the pattern view in an obvious way.
Philosophical conclusion
As we could learn, the term emergence was used in our group in a more epistemological sense. People are constructing mathematical models or analyse their empirical data and suddenly they see patterns emerging in the sense of appearing in a unexpected or hitherto unknown form. This is an epistem ological experience. But now com es the ontological part: As patterns display regularities and regularities might be a hint for lawfulness sci entists now try to find those regularities or even laws (and use it for predictions). They try to ex plain how these patterns emerge out of the prop erties of the components of the systems, i.e. the (real or hypothetical) neurons, their arrangement, their properties and their interactions. Thus the scientific endeavour may be regared as the at tempt to show that there are no strongly emergent properties in the sense we introduced this term. So why should the concept of strong emergence be useful for science? Calling something strongly emergent does not explicate anything. But it de scribes something. It describes the opinion of som eone who thinks that a certain system prop erty or emerging property (in the weak or dia chronic sense) is not fully explainable or reducible in principle. So it may be usefull to claim that something is strongly emergent only in order to provoke scientists into explaining this property. Appearantly, this is happening for the property of conscious right now: Although many thinkers are convinced that this property may never be ex plained because it is not directly observable (e.g. Stieve 1998: this issue, pp. 4 4 5 -4 5 4 ), many empiri cal scientists have begun to approach this question not be conceptual arguments alone, but by doing empirical work to show that conscious properties can perhaps be explained after all. Moreover: even if one is convinced that consciousness is strongly emergent one might attempt to falsify this view in order to find empirically based arguments as to why consciousness cannot be explained. There fore, one can be a m ethodological reductionist even if one thinks that reductionsism is wrong at the ontological level.
